A Dialectical Approach to Selectively Reusing Ontological Correspondences by Payne, Terry R & Tamma, Valentina
A Dialectical Approach to Selectively Reusing
Ontological Correspondences
Terry R. Payne1 and Valentina Tamma1
Department of Computer Science, University of Liverpool,
Liverpool L69 3BX, United Kingdom
{T.R.Payne, V.Tamma}@liverpool.ac.uk
Abstract. Effective, contextualised communication between autonomous knowl-
edge systems is dependent on the correct interpretation of exchanged messages,
based on the entities (or vocabulary) within the messages, and their ontologi-
cal definitions. However, as such systems cannot be assumed to share the same
ontologies, a mechanism for autonomously determining a mutually acceptable
alignment between the ontologies is required. Furthermore, the ontologies them-
selves may be confidential or commercially sensitive, and thus neither systems
may be willing to expose their full ontologies to other parties (this may be perti-
nent as the transaction may only relate to part, and not all of the ontology). In this
paper, we present a novel inquiry dialogue that allows such autonomous systems,
or agents to selectively assert, counter, accept and reject those correspondences
the agents previously acquired from past encounters, or from publicly available
alignment systems. Thus, such knowledge is asymmetric and incomplete (i.e. not
all agents may be aware of some correspondences, and their associated utility can
vary greatly). By strategically selecting the order in which correspondences are
disclosed, the two agents can jointly construct a bespoke alignment whilst min-
imising the disclosure of private knowledge. We show how partial alignments,
garnered from different alignment systems, can be aggregated through our dialec-
tical approach, and illustrate how argumentation can be used to eliminate ambi-
guities (i.e. when an entity in one ontology is mapped to several other entities
in another ontology). We empirically evaluate the performance of the resulting
alignment compared to the use of randomly selected alignment systems.
1 Introduction
Within open, distributed computing environments, effective communication is depen-
dent on the ability of agents to reach a mutual understanding of the entities found in
the exchanged messages. These entities, which are typically defined within an ontology
may be private to the owner (an agent, institution, commercial organisation, etc), and
thus not fully exposed or shared. This may be due to the knowledge encoded within the
ontologies being confidential or commercially sensitive. Furthermore, disclosed onto-
logical axioms could be exploited by other self-interested agents (and thus have intrinsic
value to the owner whilst undisclosed), where agents may compete over multiple trans-
actions. Thus, the lack of explicitly shared semantics can impede comprehension of the
exchanged messages. Knowledge integration has traditionally depended on the creation
of alignments between pairs of ontologies (consisting of sets of mappings between the
corresponding entities). However, most systems that align ontologies rely on the respec-
tive ontologies to be fully shared [6], and no single approach can provide a panacea for
all ontology pairs. Although such systems can support limited knowledge integration
within closed or controlled scenarios, they cannot readily facilitate autonomous inte-
gration within open, dynamic and opportunistic environments (such as in commerce,
linked open-data systems or mobile systems). However, once constructed, the align-
ments can be exchanged, shared and reused by other agents (given the right context),
and thus provide some support within such open environments.
Two divergent approaches have emerged whereby agents align their respective on-
tologies. Agents can exchange messages that consist of conceptual definitions (includ-
ing their axioms and related concepts), so that each agent can evolve its ontology to
include the exchanged concepts [1, 3]. Alternatively, various negotiation and argumen-
tation techniques have been exploited to discover mutually acceptable alignments [11,
7]; typically using a course-grained decision metric based on the type of correspon-
dence, rather than whether each correspondence is acceptable to each agent or whether
the resulting alignment is unambiguous or coherent. However, these approaches assume
that alignments are all publicly available, and shared amongst each of the agents.
We present a novel inquiry dialogue that allows agents to assert, counter, accept and
reject correspondences shared by different agents. It assumes that agents have acquired
correspondences from past encounters, or from publicly available alignment systems,
that they keep private, and that each agent associates some utility to each known cor-
respondence. However, this knowledge is typically asymmetric and incomplete (i.e. not
all agents may be aware of some correspondences, and their associated utility can vary
greatly). Therefore, agents need to engage in an inquiry dialogue where they select
which correspondences to disclose in order to ascertain the joint viability and accept-
ability of each correspondence. Furthermore, as different correspondences may map a
single entity in one ontology to different entities in other ontologies (and vice versa),
this ambiguity (in the form of one-to-many mappings) needs to be resolved for the on-
tologies to be effectively used. We empirically demonstrate that compared to reference
alignments, our approach increases the precision of the resulting alignment by up to
40% whilst only slightly affecting recall.
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows: the Correspondence Inclu-
sion Dialogue is presented in Section 2 where the performatives are illustrated through
examples. It is then empirically evaluated with respect to the alignments produced in
Section 3. Related work is presented in Section 4, before concluding in Section 5.
2 The Correspondence Inquiry Dialogue
The Correspondence Inclusion Dialogue enables two agents to exchange knowledge
about ontological correspondences through a dialogical game that satisfies the follow-
ing: 1) each agent is aware of a set of correspondences1, each with an associated utility;
2) there should be no ambiguity with respect to either the source entities in the resulting
1 We restrict ourselves to correspondences between atomic entities, and do not consider cor-
respondences that map single entities in one ontology to compound formula in another (also
known as complex correspondences [6]).
Table 1. The setM of legal moves permitted by the Correspondence Inquiry Dialogue.
Syntax Description
〈x, join, nil, nil〉 Agents assert the join move to participate within the dialogue.
〈x, assert, φ, nil〉 The agent x will assert the belief φ for a correspondence c that is be-
lieved to be viable for inclusion into the final alignment AL, and is the
undisclosed belief with highest personal utility.
〈x, object, φ, φatt〉 An agent can object to some correspondence catt if it knows of an-
other correspondence c that shares one of the two entities in catt, i.e.
ambiguous(φ, φatt), and κestc ≥ κjointcatt . The agent utters the object move
to: 1) inform the recipient of the senders personal utility of the disclosed
correspondence catt through the belief φatt; and 2) propose an alterna-
tive correspondence c by asserting the belief φ.
〈x, accept, φ, nil〉 If the agent received a belief ψ for c in the previous move, and κjointc ≥
, then the agent can confirm this by accepting the correspondence and
sharing its own personal utility in φ, where φ and ψ represent the dif-
ferent beliefs about the same correspondence.
〈x, reject, ψ, nil〉 If the agent received a belief ψ for c in the previous move, but was
not viable (i.e. κjointc < ), then the agent can reject this simply by
returning the original belief ψ.
〈x, endassert, nil, nil〉 If an agent has no more objections to make about the correspondences
negotiated since the previous assert, it can then indicate this by uttering
an endassert move. Once both agents have uttered this move sequen-
tially, a new assert move can be uttered, or the dialogue can close.
〈x, close, nil, nil〉 If an agent has no more correspondences that could be viable, but that
have not been disclosed, then it can utter a close move. However, the
dialogue does not terminate until both agents utter a sequence of close
moves (known as a matched-close).
alignment, or the target entities; 3) if alternative choices of correspondences exist, the
selection is based on the joint utility of both agents; 4) no correspondences should be
selected where their joint utility is less than some defined admissibility threshold; and
5) the alignment should be generated by disclosing as few beliefs as possible.
2.1 The Inquiry Dialogue Moves
The dialogue consists of a sequence of communicative acts, or moves2, whereby agents
take turns to assert the viability of some correspondence c for inclusion in a mutually
acceptable final alignment, AL, and respond to such assertions by: confirming the ac-
ceptability of c; rejecting the acceptability of c; or proposing alternate correspondences
in the case of ambiguity. Each agent discloses its private belief regarding the viability
of c for the alignment AL, and the agents’ goal is to rationally identify an unambiguous
set of correspondences deemed viable by both agents, given an admissibility threshold
. It assumes there are always exactly two agents,Alice andBob, who participate in the
dialogue, and that each agent plays a role in each dialogue move, i.e. an agent is either
a sender x or recipient xˆ.






















































Fig. 1. The dialogue as a state diagram. Nodes indicate the agent whose turn it to utter a move.
Moves uttered by Alice are labelled with a light font / dashed edge, whereas those uttered by Bob
are labelled with a heavy font / solid edge.
The moves of the dialogue are summarised in Table 1. The syntax of each move at
time s is of the form ms = 〈x, τ, φ, φatt〉, where x represents the identity of the agent
making the move; τ represents the move type; φ is a tuple that represents the belief that
agent x has for a correspondence and the utility it associates to that correspondence;
whereas φatt represents a belief for some correspondence that the agent is countering.
For some moves, it may not be necessary to specify one or either beliefs; in which case
they will be empty or unspecified (represented as nil).
Agents take turns to utter assert moves (i.e. to transition from state 3AB in Fig. 1).
A sender x can also make multiple moves in certain circumstances, such as an accept
or reject move (see states labelled 4A for Alice and 4B for Bob in Fig. 1). This enables
an agent to accept or reject a disclosed correspondence before making some other move
(such as raising a object move), or signalling its intention to end a negotiation round
(through an endassert move).
2.2 Ontologies, Correspondences and Beliefs
The agents negotiate over the viability of different correspondences that could be used
to align the two agents’ ontologies. The dialogue therefore assumes that each agent
maintains an ontological model O, which represents the agent’s knowledge about the
environment, and its background knowledge (domain knowledge, beliefs, tasks, etc.).
O is modelled as a set of axioms describing classes and their relations.3
During any given encounter, the sender and the recipient use only part of their onto-
logical model (i.e. they use their “working” ontologyW) to communicate. This could
be based on an ontology module relevant to the task [2, 4], or the agent’s ontological
knowledge may comprise several different ontologies (as illustrated in Fig. 2). To avoid
confusion, the sender’s ontology is denoted Wx, whereas the recipient’s ontology is
W xˆ, and W˜ denotes the ontology signature; i.e. the set of class and property names




{a, b, a ⊑ b}
Alignment Store Δ
휙alice = ⟨⟨b, z, =⟩, 0.9⟩
휙alice = ⟨⟨a, x, =⟩, 0.8⟩
휙alice = ⟨⟨b, w, =⟩, 0.6⟩
휙alice = ⟨⟨b, x, =⟩, 0.5⟩
JointBelief Store JB
휙alice = ⟨⟨a, x, =⟩, 0.8⟩
ψbob = ⟨⟨a, x, =⟩, 0.6⟩
. . .
Private Knowledge Public Knowledge
joint(⟨a, x, =⟩) = 0.7
. . .
Fig. 2. The knowledge model assumed by each agent. Only alignments grounded in the Working
OntologyW are listed in Alice’s Alignment Store ∆. As the correspondence 〈a, x,=〉 has been
asserted and accepted by the agents, they appear in Alice’s Joint Belief Store JB. As Alice knows
both her, and Bob’s belief for this correspondence, she can calculate the joint belief using the Avg
aggregation function.
used in W . Both Wx and W xˆ are fragments4 of the sender and recipient ontologies
(respectively) that denote each agent’s private subset of the ontology used to model the
corresponding entities used in the transaction. We also assume that agents do not dis-
close their “working” ontologies, and hence the participants involved in the encounter
have no knowledge whether these ontologies overlap completely, partially, or in the
worst case not at all (which would imply that no interaction would be possible [4]).
For agents to interoperate in an encounter, they need to determine an alignment
AL between the two working ontology fragmentsWx andW xˆ for that encounter. An
alignment [6] consists of a set of correspondences that establish a logical relationship5
between the entities (classes, properties or roles, and instances) belonging to each of the
two ontologies. The universe of all possible correspondences is therefore denoted C.
Definition 1: A correspondence is a triple denoted c = 〈e, e′, r〉 such that e ∈ W˜x,
e′ ∈ W˜ xˆ, r ∈ {=}.
Agents associate a private, static utility κc to a correspondence, which represents the
viability of c appearing inAL. The tuple 〈c, κc〉, where 0 ≤ κc ≤ 1, is a belief an agent
holds on a correspondence c. We refer to beliefs sent by x as φ, the beliefs sent by xˆ (to
x) as ψ, and the set of all beliefs is denoted B. The function corr : B 7→ C returns the
correspondence c for some belief. The aim of the dialogue is to select an unambiguous
(i.e. where no entity appears more than once) set of viable correspondences, AL ⊆ C,
which maps between the entities in Wx and W xˆ, and whose joint utility is at least as
great as the admissibility threshold . The function ent(c) returns the set of entities e
and e′ for a correspondence c.
4 We do not prescribe the logical properties exhibited by the fragment, but refer to the work on
ontology modularisation, e.g. [2].
5 We only consider logical equivalence (as opposed to subsumption (v) and disjointness (⊥)), as
it has the property that correspondences are symmetric; i.e. 〈e, e′,=〉 is logically equivalent to
〈e′, e,=〉, and thus can be easily used by either agent. Furthermore, the majority of alignment
generation systems only computes equivalence correspondences
Each agent manages a private knowledge base, known as the Alignment Store (∆),
which holds the beliefs an agent has over its correspondences, and a public knowl-
edge base, or Joint Belief Store (JB), which contains correspondences that have been
shared (see Fig. 2). We distinguish between the sender’s stores, ∆x and JBx, and the
recipient’s stores, ∆xˆ and JBxˆ, respectively. The sender’s joint belief store JBx (JBxˆ
for the receiver) contains beliefs that are exchanged as part of the dialogue and hence
contains beliefs sent and received by x (conversely xˆ). Throughout the dialogue, both
agents will be aware of all of the beliefs shared6; i.e. JBx = JBxˆ.
2.3 Aggregating Beliefs and the Upper Bound
Within the dialogue, the agents try to ascertain the unambiguous, mutually acceptable
correspondences to include in the final alignment AL by selectively sharing those cor-
respondences that are believed to have the highest utility. Once each agent knows of the
other agent’s utility for a given correspondence c, it can then calculate c’s joint utility,
and check if it is greater than or equal to the admissibility threshold, . This thresh-
old is used to filter out correspondences with a low κc, whilst minimising the number
of beliefs disclosed. The function joint : C 7→ [0, 1] returns the joint utility for some
correspondence c ∈ C. This results in either: 1) κjointc calculated as an aggregation
function of the utilities for both agents (if both utilities have been disclosed); or 2) κestc
for a conservative, upper estimate if only one of the two utilities is known, such that
κestc ≥ κjointc . The intuition behind this aggregation function here is that the mean
utility is representative of the beliefs of both agents; if one agent believes strongly in a
correspondence, but the other agent believes the same correspondence has little utility,
then this aggregation function reflects a balanced, joint perspective by both agents on
the same correspondence.
Definition 2: The function joint : C 7→ [0, 1] returns the mean joint utility for some









c ) ψ ∈ JBx;φ /∈ ∆x ∧ φ /∈ JBx
avg(κxc , κ
x
upper) φ ∈ ∆x;φ, ψ /∈ JBx
When the sender x receives a belief ψ from xˆ (ψ ∈ JBx) on a correspondence c,
it can assess the joint utility for c as the average between its own utility and the one
by xˆ , assuming that x holds a belief on c, i.e. φ ∈ ∆x (Case 1). If, however, x has
no prior knowledge of c (i.e. φ /∈ ∆x), then κxc = 0, and the joint utility depends only
on κxˆc (Case 2). Finally, if x holds a belief on c that has not yet been disclosed to xˆ
(φ ∈ ∆x;φ /∈ JBx) and if ψ has not been disclosed by xˆ (ψ /∈ JBx), then κxˆc can only
be estimated (Case 3). The upper bound, κxupper is explained below.
Example 1: Bob makes the move 〈bob, assert, 〈〈a, x,=〉, 0.6〉, nil〉. Alice adds the be-
lief ψbob = 〈〈a, x,=〉, 0.6〉 into her Joint Belief store, JB (Fig. 2). She then responds
with the move 〈alice, accept, 〈〈a, x,=〉, 0.8〉, nil〉, which is also stored in JB. Now
6 We will not distinguish between the two stores JBx and JBxˆ in the remainder of this paper.
Table 2. The individual and joint utilities for the correspondences in the examples, and how they
map between ontological entities.
c κAlicec κBobc joint(c)
〈a, x,=〉 0.8 0.6 0.7
〈b, x,=〉 0.5 0.8 0.65
〈b, w,=〉 0.6 0.4 0.5
〈b, z,=〉 0.9 — 0.45
〈c, y,=〉 — 0.2 0.1








both beliefs have been disclosed, the joint belief joint(〈a, x,=〉) can be calculated;
i.e. avg(0.8, 0.6) = 0.7.7
Each agent takes turns to propose a belief regarding some correspondence, and the
other participant confirms if the actual joint utility κjointc ≥ . Proposals are made by
identifying an undisclosed correspondence with the highest degree of belief κxc . As the
dialogue proceeds, each subsequent correspondence asserted will have an equivalent or
lower degree of belief than that previously asserted by the same agent.
Example 2: It is Bob’s turn to assert a new correspondence. If he were starting a
new dialogue, he would assert the correspondence 〈〈b, x,=〉, 0.8〉, as this would be
the one with the highest utility κBobc . But in a separate dialogue, the correspondences
〈〈b, x,=〉, 0.8〉 and 〈〈a, x,=〉, 0.6〉 have already been disclosed. So the next one to as-
sert is 〈〈b, w,=〉, 0.4〉, as this is the undisclosed correspondence with the highest utility.
However, he first has to determine if the estimated joint utility is ≥ .
Whenever a correspondence is asserted, or included in an objection, the agent should
check that its estimated joint utility is not less than the admissibility threshold, . Be-
cause the estimate is an upper estimate, the actual joint utility could be lower, and the
correspondence still rejected. Agents determine this upper estimate by exploiting the
fact that assertions are always made on the undisclosed correspondence with the high-
est utility. Thus, if one agent asserts some correspondence, the other agent’s utility for
that asserted correspondence will never be greater than their own previous assertion.
Therefore, each agent maintains an upper bound, κxupper, corresponding to the other
agents assertions (prior to the dialogue, κxupper = 1.0).
Example 3: In example 2, Bob wanted to assert 〈〈b, w,=〉, 0.4〉, but needed to deter-
mine if the estimated joint utility ≥ . Alice’s previous assertion was for the correspon-
dence 〈〈a, x,=〉, 0.8〉, and therefore κxupper = 0.8. If we assume that  = 0.5, Bob can
determine that the estimated joint(〈b, w,=〉) = avg(0.4, 0.8) = 0.6 ≥ , and thus
makes the assertion.
2.4 Ambiguity and Argumentation
Ambiguities occur when more than one correspondence maps several entities in the
source ontology to a single entity in the target ontology (or vice versa). This can result
7 Note that these examples illustrate properties of the dialogue. However, the actual moves in
the dialogue would depend on the agent starting the dialogue. See [9] for a fully documented
example walkthrough.
in logical incoherence (i.e. generate unsatisfiable concepts). Objections can be made to
an ambiguous belief, once it has been asserted. An ambiguity can be determined if there
is some entity that exists in the correspondences of two beliefs.
Definition 3: Ambiguity occurs given beliefs φ, φ′, φ 6= φ′ (denoted ambiguous(φ, φ′))
iff ent(corr(φ)) ∩ ent(corr(φ′)) 6= ∅.
A belief φ attacks another belief φ′ if they result in an ambiguity, and the joint utility
for φ is greater than or equal to that of φ′, and above the admissibility threshold, .
Definition 4: Given two beliefs φ, φ′, φ 6= φ′, attacks(φ, φ′) is true iff ambiguous(φ, φ′)∧
joint(corr(φ)) ≥ joint(corr(φ′)) ≥ .
Attacks are represented in the dialogue as object moves. There are three scenarios
where an agent responds with object:
1. when a new correspondence has appeared in a previous assert or object move. In
this case, the sender needs to respond with its own belief of the correspondence,
but may also want to raise its own objection.
2. when there is an undisclosed correspondence that could be used to attack a previ-
ously disclosed correspondence. This is where agents can identify other attacks on
ambiguous correspondences.
3. when a disclosed correspondence could attack another disclosed correspondence,
but the attack does not appear in the attack graph Ag. This ensures that all possible
attacks have been identified within Ag.
In each case, an additional ambiguous correspondence is added to the attack graph Ag.
Example 4: Alice asserts the correspondence 〈〈b, w,=〉, 0.6〉. Bob realises that he has
an alternate correspondence, 〈〈b, x,=〉, 0.8〉, which shares the entity “b”. He estimates
the joint utility for this alternate correspondence as joint(〈b, x,=〉) = avg(0.8, κxupper)
= 0.7 (here, κxupper = 0.6), which is ≥ joint(〈b, w,=〉) = 0.5, i.e. the joint utility for
Alice’s asserted correspondence. Therefore Bob makes the move8 〈bob, object, 〈〈b, x,=
〉, 0.8〉, 〈〈b, w,=〉, 0.6〉〉.
Thus, the dialogue generates a set of possibly ambiguous joint-beliefs, b ∈ Ag such
that b = 〈c, κjointc 〉, that should be included in the final alignment AL, where each
b represents the belief regarding the inclusion of some correspondence c, and joint(c)









Fig. 3. The Final Attack Graph.
Once the dialogue has closed (i.e. after a
matched-close), the agents resolve the attack
graph to determine which of the correspon-
dences disclosed should be included in the
final alignment. A heuristic approach, based
on Dung’s argumentation framework [5] is
used for resolving the graph. Recall that, as JBx = JBxˆ, both agents will form iden-
tical attack graphs. Each graph (see the example in Figure 3) includes only those cor-
respondences which appeared in an assert or object move, and then were subsequently
accepted, or themselves objected to (i.e. attacked). The objections are represented as
edges between the vertices, such that vertices with a higher joint degree of belief will
8 Note that Bob responds by providing his belief over Alice’s asserted correspondence, and also
provides his belief for the attacking correspondence.
attack vertices with lower values. The attack graph is traversed, starting with the highest
value vertex; if the highest value vertex attacks another vertex, that other vertex is then
removed from the graph. This continues until all of the remaining vertices have been
traversed. For example, in Figure 3, 〈a, x,=〉 attacks 〈b, x,=〉, which can no longer at-
tack either 〈b, w,=〉 or 〈b, z,=〉. Furthermore, 〈b, w,=〉 attacks 〈b, z,=〉, which is then
removed from the graph. The correspondences found in the remaining vertices (once all
attacks have been resolved) are included within the final alignment AL.
3 Empirical Evaluation
We empirically evaluate the effectiveness of the proposed dialogue by investigating the
alignment solutions found. We also explore how the use of the admissibility threshold
 can affect the resulting alignments, by eliminating possibly spurious or erroneous
correspondences (i.e. those with little evidence to support their validity). The following
hypothesis has been tested using OAEI 9 data sets:
Selecting and combining correspondences taken from a number of different
alignment methods can yield comparable performance to existing alignment
methods, when measured using the precision, recall and f-measure metrics.
The OEAI 2012 Conference Track comprises various ontologies describing the same
conceptual domain (conference organisation) and alignments between pairs of ontolo-
gies, generated by 17 different ontology alignment approaches. Seven ontologies were
selected as these were accompanied by reference alignments (defined by a domain ex-
pert), resulting in 17 different alignments for each pair of ontologies, and 7!(7−2)!2! = 21
ontology combination pairs.
The empirical evaluations were conducted over each of the 21 ontology pairs (i.e.
for each experiment, an agent would be assigned an ontology, but would have no knowl-
edge of the ontology of the other agent), with a random selection of 16 alignments
divided between the two agents (such that each agent knows of 8 alignments). The
allocation was random, and ensured that no alignment belonged to both agents. We
exploited the fact that, as the alignments were generated independently, some corre-
spondences could be found in more than one alignment. Whilst this is no guarantee
that such correspondences are necessarily correct, it provides a mechanism whereby
agents can assign some κc for each correspondence c based on the probability of find-
ing that correspondence in the alignments each agent possessed. Experiments were also
repeated for different admissibility thresholds; as 16 alignments were divided between
the two agents, the threshold was varied in sixteenths; e.g.  = 216 required there to be at
least two instances of a correspondence c to be found (i.e. joint(c) ≥ 216 ) before c was
considered. Each experiment was repeated 500 times. The resulting alignments were
evaluated using the precision, recall and f-measure metrics, where: precision (p) is the
proportion of correspondences found by the dialogue that also appear in the reference
alignment; recall (r) is the proportion of correspondences in the reference alignment
that were also found by the dialogue; and the f-measure (f ) represents the harmonic









































































Delta recall performance for all 21 Ontology Pairs




































Delta f-measure performance for all 21 Ontology Pairs
Fig. 5. Delta f-measures (∆fD) for all 21 ontology pairs.
A baseline was generated by assuming that a naive approach for finding an align-
ment would consist of an agent randomly picking and using one of the pre-defined
alignments. To evaluate the alignments generated by the dialogue, we first calculate the
precision (pA), recall (rA) and f-measure (fA) of this average alignment for each on-
tology pair. These are then used to generate the difference between these measures and
the corresponding ones for the alignments generated by the dialogue: i.e. ∆pD = pD−
pA, ∆rD = rD− rAand ∆fD = fD− fA. Thus, values above zero indicate better re-
sults compared to the baseline, whereas those below are worse. These values have been
plotted against different admissibility thresholds, ranging from  = 116 (i.e where no fil-
tering occurs - the existence of one correspondence is sufficient for consideration by the
dialogue) to  = 1616 (i.e. only those correspondences that were found in every alignment
known by both agents were considered). The graphs for differences in precision and re-
call are given in Figure 4, whereas Figure 5 plots the differences in F-measures for all
21 ontology pairs. Two vertical limits are also given in Figure 5: l = 316 and u =
14
16
represent the lower and upper ranges where the average f-measure for the dialogue’s
alignment is significantly higher (using a one-sided paired t-test where α = 0.05) than
fA. Figure 5 demonstrates how, in most cases, the f-measure performance of the dia-
logue is significantly higher than that achieved from selecting an alignment at random,
when l ≤  < u. Thus, the dialogue produces alignments that are more precise
than selecting an original alignment at random in this range, although r is worse when
 < 516 . At  =
5
16 , p ranges from -5.5% to a 40.3% increase for different ontology
pairs, whereas r ranges from -12% to 19% increase. The maximum p occurs at  = 616
for cmt-ekaw (47.37%), whereas r falls in general to between 0% and -12.19%.
The dialogue performance degrades for low and high thresholds. When  = 116 (i.e.
no filtering), a large number of correspondences appear in the alignment, yielding a high
r but very low p, suggesting that although the correct correspondences were found, a
high number of incorrect ones were also included. Whilst this could be a property of
the dataset used (several alignments include a number of rare, but erroneous correspon-
dences), it demonstrates the value of eliminating low utility correspondences (e.g. in
this case, those that were found in the source alignments with low frequency). When
 > 1416 , a high number of correspondences are eliminated (an average of 2.8% of each
agent’s correspondences appear in the final alignment when  = 1616 ), resulting in a
sharp drop in ∆fD, which supports our hypothesis.
4 Related Work
A number of different approaches have addressed the reconciliation of heterogeneous
ontologies by using some form of rational reasoning. In [1] an ontology negotiation pro-
tocol was discussed to enable agents to exchange parts of their ontology by a process
of successive interpretations, whereas [3] presented an approach whereby agents shared
an explicit goal to collaboratively evolve a common ontology. Whilst these approaches
resolve semantic interoperability through negation to achieve semantic homogeneity,
other approaches attempt to align the heterogeneous ontologies through negotiation;
typically through the use of argumentation [7, 11]. Argumentation has been used as a
rational means for agents to select ontology correspondences based on the notion of
partial-order preferences over their different properties (e.g. structural vs terminologi-
cal) [7]. A variant was also proposed [11] which represented ontology mappings as dis-
junctive queries in Description Logics. Typically, these approaches have used a course-
grained decision metric based on the type of correspondence, rather than whether or
not each correspondence was acceptable to each agent (given other mutually accepted
correspondences), and do not consider the notion of private, or asymmetric knowledge
(the correspondences are assumed to be publicly accessible). A formal dialogue that
allows agents to debate in order to reach an agreement over conflicting concept repre-
sentations and assertions and the dialogues for overcoming semantic heterogeneity is
proposed in [8]. This dialogue detects conflicting representations and tries to resolve
reasoning with conflicting information in the commitment store, rather than trying to
reach an agreement over the correspondences, hence our model handles cases where
entities with different representations are explicitly declared equivalent. A Max-Sum
algorithm was used in [10] for synthesising ontology alignment methods whilst max-
imising social welfare in a group of interacting agents. Although similar to the aims
of our study, [10] assumes that all agents have knowledge of the ontologies to align,
and each agent is associated with an alignment method with its own preferences on the
assessed relation, and quantified by a degree of confidence.
5 Conclusions
We present and empirically evaluate an inquiry dialogue that facilitates negotiation over
asymmetric and incomplete knowledge of ontological correspondences. Two agents
can selectively disclose private beliefs regarding the utility of previously acquired and
reused ontological correspondences. Ambiguities are resolved through the use of argu-
mentation, that identifies solutions based on the combined beliefs. The dialogue was
implemented and empirically evaluated using correspondences found in alignments
sourced from 17 different approaches over 21 ontology pairs, and using a set of refer-
ence alignments. The results supported the hypothesis that, by filtering low probability
correspondences, alignments generated by our dialogue performed as well as selecting
an existing alignment approach at random, when compared to reference alignments.
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